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BOOK REVIEWS
REVIEW ARTICLES
ByJ. Thorsten
Sellin. New York: Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company, 1976. Pp. viii, 202. $10.00.
Both in the Preface and the Postscript, Professor Sellin states the major proposition of
this historical treatise: namely, that the punishments meted out to criminals were originally
punishments inflicted on slaves by their masters; that later on these were extended to crimes
committed by lowclass freemen; and that ultimately they were applied to offenders regardless of their social status. Sellin attributes this
interpretation to Professor Gustav Radbruch
of Germany, and the book reviewed here is a
documentation of this thesis. With this work
the author establishes himself once again, in
addition to his many other accomplishments,
as the foremost American historian in criminology, corrections and criminal justice and undoubtedly as the most erudite living criminologist.
The work is a monumental historical monograph in which the author has assembled a
tremendous amount of material from antiquity,
the middle ages and modern times, throughout
the Western world.
The evidence assembled by the author in
support of his interpretational model of the
development of punishment is convincing, and
the reader who takes the time to go through
the endless collection of citations from the
writings and documents covering some twentyfive centuries can hardly avoid agreeing with
Professors Radbruch and Sellin that their
proposition has something to it.
In this reviewer's opinion on the basis of the
assembled evidence, the perspective on the
evolution of criminal punishment which traces
its origins to the handling of slaves is quite
cogent, meaningful and interesting. It should
play an important role in understanding the
history of punishments. However, it should be
quite obvious that it is not the only prism
.through which the evolution of punishment
can be viewed. There are many factors which
SLAVERY AND THE PENAL SYSTEM.

were operative in the development of punitive
sanctions of criminal law, and the universal
practice of applying punitive sanctions to criminals is not related to the institution of slavery
alone. Crime and punishment appear also in
societies which do not have a history of slavery.
A closer look at the work raises a number of
questions. One of these is the concept of slavery
as used by the author. The concept is not
precisely defined anywhere in the book. While
there is, of course, a common trait in the status
of people referred to as slaves by Professor
Sellin, a wide variety of relationships is nevertheless subsumed under this term. One wonders how much essential similarity there is
between the status of a prisoner of war, captured by the victor as in the case of the expanding Roman state and made a servant and a
chattel, and a peasant in the Russian empire
prior to the emancipation of the serfs in 1861,
who is perceived as being attached to the land
which he tills.
Undoubtedly there is a certain similarity in
all of the situations referred to by the author
as slavery. Although Professor Sellin has not
stated so himself, one might consider this similarity to be a status accorded to certain categories of people within the state who lack the
personal freedom enjoyed by other members
of the society and who must obey the directions
of those who own them or in one capacity or
another are in charge of managing them.
Except in his descriptions of the specific
historical settings, Professor Sellin operates
with this very general concept without further
conceptualizing and clarifying the specific social situations which he subsumes under it. Yet
some discerning of the type of situations would
be profitable. For instance, granted that the
status of an unfree person is recognized in the
state, there is a difference between the private
ownership of slaves and the public utilization
of them. There is a difference between the
assignment of certain individuals to other
members of the society, to obey and'work for
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them as domestics or workers, and the relationships which are inherent in the economic order
of an agricultural economy, where the peasants
tilling the land are constrained to stay on that
land and work it for the benefit of members of
the dominant segment of the population.
Professor Sellin's method is to abstract from
all these situations the very general characteristic of the existence of relatively free and
relatively less free people in the state, with the
former having the legal right or the factual
power to direct and use the services of the less
free categories of citizens. In the interrelationships between these free and less free members
of the society, penal sanctions are usually utilized as one of the methods of social control.
Because of the weakness of the subordinate
group and the lack of concern for their wellbeing on the part of the dominant group, these
sanctions often become very cruel. As has been
pointed out above, the main purpose of Professor Sellin's exploration is to demonstrate that
having originated in these interrelationships
between the master and slave groups, the punishments are gradually applied to the lower
socio-economic strata of the free population
and later are generalized to the entire population. This is where Professor Sellin leaves his
hypothesis, satisfied that it is supported by the
historical evidence which he has assembled.
It is, however, regrettable that Professor Sellin confines himself to this specific and limited
aspect of the topic. The vast historical evidence
which he has assembled would appear to lend
itself to richer generalizations than the one to
which Professor Sellin has chosen to limit himself. Without questioning the cogency of the
narrow proposition advanced by Professor Sellin, one is tempted to venture some broader
generalization. The historical sequence of
events which Sellin finds within most of the
societies which he has studied seems to support
a model of historical evolution which, reduced
to the simplest terms, can be described as
follows. The process begins with the presence
of a dominant and a subordinate group, the
latter being assigned a clear-cut inferior social,
economic and political status, which Professor
Sellin labels as slavery. Among other things,
the dominant group develops a system of harsh
punitive sanctions as a means of social control.
Gradually the subordinate groups gain in
power and often become numerically too large
to be kept in the subservient position. As the
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result of uprisings and reforms, they are gradually granted a more attractive social status
and emerge as free members of the society,
although perhaps still in a lower socio-economic
status. Two parallel phenomena seem to take
place rather regularly. A new lowest class appears to take the place of the previously lowest
unfree population. On the other hand, there
are always some members of the originally
dominant group who, as the result of personal
failures, are allowed in some respects functionally to drop down to the status of the lower
groups. In this process the more painful and
degrading sanctions spread to the now free
strata of the population. Impressionistically,
one might say that the punishments follow the
social group as it rises in social status. The
above-sketched historical process often progresses to even greater democratization of society, with the previous class differences gradually and partially disappearing and the punitive sanctions being applied even more generally as the result.
In its final stages, the above model of the
evolution of societies seems to offer a bifurcation. In some cases the humanitarian impulse,
which often accompanies the final democratization of the society, leads to the humanization
of punitive sanctions. Some would choose to
interpret this as self-protection: when the upper classes begin to be exposed to punitive
sanctions, these become less cruel. The other
pattern seems to be that in the last stages of
their development, societies begin to crumble.
One can hypothesize whether this happens as
the result of external factors such as the arrival
of a different population, as the Germanic
tribes invading the Roman Empire, or as the
result of internal processes, as interpreted by
Spengler in his Untergang des Abendlandes. In
the latter case, as desperate efforts to hold a
nation together are made, cruel punitive methods of social control in the form of severe
punishments reappear.
The above is an example of an interpretational model which is ripe for formulation on
the basis of the historical evidence collected by
Professor Sellin. For some reason the author
did not take any steps in this direction in the
present work.
In that connection, the theory of Professor
Eugen Ehrlich comes to mind; namely, that
the coercive order of the state is primarily
directed against those who are outside the pale
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of society and those who have been cast out:
"strangers and outcasts,"
[lif we consider not individual cases, but the
great bulk of the daily work done by the criminal
courts, we shall see that criminal law is directed
almost exclusively against those whom descent,
economic distress, neglected education or moral
degradation has excluded from the human associations. It is only in the case of these outcasts
that the widest association, which includes even
them, i.e., the state, steps in with its power to
punish. The state as an organ of society protects
society against those that are outside the pale of
society.,
The basic premises of Ehrlich's Sociology of Law
are quite compatible with the hypothesis which
Professor Sellin undertakes to prove.
Another context within which the book
should be considered is its relationship to radical criminology. Written in 1976, it happened
to appear at a time when radical criminology

was strongly voicing its claims also in the Western democracies, outside of the boundaries of
the socialist countries. The treatment which

the author accords the topic, relating punitive
sanctions to social stratification within the soci-

ety, can be interpreted as either providing very
strong and easily usable evidence for the radical

criminologists in supporting their theory or as
actually constituting direct documentation of
many of the claims of radical criminology.

Some of the passages in the book, for example
the opening paragraphs of Chapter XI, "Convict Lease System," with their emphasis on the
master class and the penal servitude which
made "public slaves of black and poor and
friendless white convicts," would certainly
please the so-called radical criminologist. A
similar impression is left by the closing paragraph of the book, which speaks of the penal

system of the Middle Ages, "which oppressed
the lower classes and favored the dominant

upper classes, who then later shaped the law
and administered justice." To be sure, the
author does not make any explicit commitment
to any school of criminological thought, and
his careful limitation of his topic (to the use of

punishments previously applied to slaves and
later having more general application within
the society) does not commit him to any etiological theory of criminal conduct except by im1
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plication and especially in terms of the labeling
theory.
Professor Sellin's description and analysis of
the concentration or corrective labor camps for
political offenders in the Soviet Union, especially in Siberia, give the familiar picture of
certain segments of the population condemned
to penal servitude and being used as the labor
force for performance of difficult and healthendangering tasks. Professor Sellin's interpretational model of the origin of punitive sanctions in the interrelationship between the master class and the subordinate slave or low class
segment of the population, which he so readily
applied to so many societies of Western civilization, is now faced with the problem of the
presence of the same penal servitude in the
avowedly classless society of the socialist-communist state. In the early years of the Soviet
Union, the penal servitude in the labor camps
could have been explained by pointing to the
presence of members of the formerly dominant
class and by thus finding a retention of the
same pattern, only with a changed power structure. Sixty years after the revolution and the
establishment of a classless society, it is strange
indeed to find the same penal servitude as
before, if one subscribes to the class struggle as
its source, Professor Sellin himself does not
sound optimistic (p, 132) about its disappearance. Perhaps this represents one of the critical
testing stones of the author's hypothesis.
No review of thp book would be complete
without some mention of the serendipitous
contributions which no student of criminal justice or criminology should miss. The wonderful
quotation from the Greek philosopher Protagoras (481-411 BC.) formulates the essence of
the general and special prevention or deterrence theories of punishments as clearly as the
best writings of continental jurists of the 19th
century or American writers of the current
period of revival of the interest in punitive
sanctions, such as Professors Norval Morris,
Franklin Zimring or James Q. Wilson. An
intermediate statement, repeating almost verbatim Protogoras' formulation, appears in a
quotation from Cesare Beccaria's famous treatise Of Crimes and Punishments, published in
1764, which Professor Sellin gives on page 65
of his work: "The aim of punishment . , . [is]
none other than to prevent the criminal from
doing more damage to his co-citizens and to
deter others from doing likewise." One is in-
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duced to philosophize how little has been added
to the basic theory of punishment in the course
of almost 2500 years since the analysis was
made by the famous Sophist.
Another such historically significant tidbit is
contained in Professor Sellin's same reference
to Beccaria's treatise. It concerns Beccaria's
views on the death penalty, a punishment
which, once again, is the burning issue of
today, not only in the United States but also in
many other countries. The popular view is that
Beccaria, who on the one hand is credited with
the humanization of criminal law and on the
other is considered as the founder or main
spokesman of the strict classical school of criminal law, opposed the death penalty. While this
is correct, quotes given by Professor Sellin
make it clear that Beccaria opposed the death
penalty because he felt that it was ineffective
and that therefore punishment "worse than
death" should be used instead. Beccaria considered "lifelong penal slavery" to be much more
effective punishment. Beccaria's description of
the lifelong state of a beast of burden, which
he apparently recommended, certainly contradicts the prevailing popular image of his views
on punishments. This comment, of course, is
not an invitation to forget Beccaria's crusade
for the general reduction of punitive sanctions
to the absolute minimum of suffering, just
sufficient to effectuate special and general prevention functions in terms of the "felicific calculus" later popularized by Jeremy Bentham.
For the historian of criminal justice, corrections and criminology, quite aside from the
main theme of the book, Professor Sellin's
description of the punitive systems developed
in Europe toward the end of the Middle Ages
and continuing through the 18th century is of
signal importance. His analysis of galley slavery, public works, houses of correction and the
bagne for the first time clarifies for the American reader the picture of rather complicated
and overlapping developments in the handling
of the criminal offender during this period.
Professor Sellin has dealt with some of these
topics in his earlier writing, but in this work,
chapters III through VIII give a remarkably
complete and documented history of that epoch. No doubt this account will serve as a
permanent reference on the subject.
Not so serendipitous is the very interesting
analysis of the resurgence of the convict lease
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system in the South after the end of the Civil
War and abolition of slavery. Sellin's interpretation of the convict lease system as involuntary
servitude in punishment for crime to substitute
for the recently abolished slavery is a challenging contribution to the study of the history of
prison labor. In general, chapters X, XI and
XII, in which Professor Sellin analyzes penal
servitude and slavery in the United States under the headings "The Antebellum South,"
"The Convict Lease System" and "Chain Gangs
and Prison Farms," offer to the student of
punishment a number of fresh and penetrating
insights into the history of criminal justice in
this country in the 19th century. The thought
presents itself that these developments were
taking place at the same time that the National
Congress on Penitentiary and Reformatory Discipline in Cincinnati in 1870 was formulating
its famous Declaration of Principles, which for
a century served as a landmark for prison
reform and the development of corrections. A
quote from Professor Sellin's Preface to the
book is rightly in place here: "In short, the
demands of the labor market shaped the penal
system and determined its transformation over
the years, more or less unaffected by theories
of punishment in vogue." The present reviewer, though, would be willing to give greater
credit to the power of ideas and ideologies.
Professor Sellin is a sociologist-criminologist,
and his early studies, Culture Conflict and Crime,
established him as a nationally known etiologist
of criminal behavior. His long association with
the International Penal and Penitentiary Commission and later with the United Nations Social Defense Section and the Congresses on the
Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders brought him into close contact with the
issues of punishment and corrections. His lifelong interest in capital punishment further
enhanced his understanding and his authority
as an expert in matters of punitive sanctions.
This monograph is another interesting, original and challenging contribution to the understanding of crime control.
PETER P. LEJINS
University of Maryland
THE CRIMINAL PERSONALITY; VOLUME 1: PROFILE FOR CHANGE. By Samuel Yochelson and
Stanton E. Samenow. New York: Jason Aronson, Inc., 1976. Pp. xi, 538. $25.00.
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This work provides support to those advocating harsher punishment for criminals and
abandonment of treatment. The authors assert
not only that existing sociological and psychological theories have failed to provide effective
intervention strategies, but also that the theories are inaccurate explanations for criminal
behavior. Their thesis is that criminals choose
specific thinking patterns which inevitably lead
to crime.
This conclusion is based on a fifteen year
clinical study in which the authors spent
hundreds of hours interviewing each of 240
persons (all but three were men) hospitalized
for criminal behavior and mental illness. Some
300,000 pages of clinical notes have been distilled into three volumes, of which this is the
first. The product is a massive body of description and generalizations based on the subjective
evaluation of the responses of a convenience
sample of institution inmates. It is an impressive display, but it is not a logically convincing
argument. The sample is not representative of
any population of subgroup of criminal offenders, nor are the findings presented in a way
that permits independent evaluation of the
conclusions. Nonetheless, the authors repeatedly use the phrase "the criminal mind," suggesting their findings are generalizable to all
offenders.
The strength of the book is in its detailed
description of thinking patterns. The argument
breaks down When description becomes analysis. In explaining how the criminal chooses to
adopt criminal thinking, the authors write
"[T]he criminal child rejects the socializing influences and makes doing the forbidden a way
of life ...... (p. 287) This notion that an
individual has the capacity to reject primary
socialization contradicts much of our understanding of the origins of self. The authors do
not explain how every criminal acquires the
allegedly ubiquitous fifty-two criminal thinking
patterns.
The proposed program for changing the
criminal is the antithesis of Rational Emotive
Therapy. Yochelson & Samenow tell their patients that they [the patients] are criminals, bad
people, and that anything less than a total
"conversion" to responsible thinking will result
in continued criminal behavior. "The program
emphasizes that that self-disgust be maintained
and that fear serve as a cornerstone and guide

to responsible living." (p. 50) They cite as their
measure of success twelve men who have become totally responsible after participating in
the program.
Whether the treatment program works and
whether there are thinking patterns common
to all criminals are still open questions, but it
seems likely that this book will be used to justify
harsher punishment before those questions are
answered.
JOSEPH E. JACOBY

University of Houston at Clear Lake City

By Edward H. Coughran. La Jolla, Cal.: Computer
Center, University of California, San Diego,
1976. Pp. 1110. $9.00.
Emerging technology has historically presented us with a variety of new social, professional and legal problems. The technology of
electronic data processing is no exception. The
sociologist now has a new class of white collar
criminal to study and understand. The tool of
this new criminal is the computer, used in a
variety of ingenious illegal and questionable
ways. To protect against this crime, managers
of computer installations must develop adequate controls to insure the security of their
equipment and guard against property damage, theft of data and intentional misuse. Lawyers and the courts are also presently in search
of adequate statutes to insure the protection of
innocent parties against the unauthorized use
of computer hardware and software. The general public, too, requires assurances that computer-based information relating to citizens is
adequately protected from abuse.
ComputerAbuse and CriminalLaw is one source
document which can be used in the study of
this new field. This text isbest described not as
a book or monograph, but as an article with a
lengthy appendix. The body of the text describes types of computer abuse and relevant
criminal law.
The material describing computer abuse is
particularly difficult to read because the author
fails to assist the interested reader with a proper
organization of material. The author skips
from one subject to another without warning,
sometimes introducing material with little or
no relevance. Paragraphs and whole sections
lack clear focus and integration into a single
COMPUTER ABUSE AND CRIMINAL LAW.

BOOK REVIEWS

theme. There are also no summaries to compensate for this style of presentation. The serious reader would do well to look elsewhere for
a clear description of events which can compromise the integrity of computing systems.
Sections on criminal law are better organized
and presented. A lengthy discussion of search
and seizure in criminal cases involving computer abuse is well-documented. The admissibility of computer evidence in state and federal
courts is also well-treated. An extensive bibliography follows these sections on the law. If
the reader is left with only a fuzzy understanding of what the law says about this class of
crimes, the author is not to blame. The real
problem of how to treat the many aspects of
computer-related crime has not yet been clarified in our state and federal courts. Students
of the law interested in a more comprehensive
view of this topic should supplement their
reading with the findings of the American Bar
Association's task force on computer crime.
The Rutgers Journal of Computers and the Law
also provides an excellent source for further
study.
The appendix occupies 45% of the text and
is of marginal value. It contains a variety of
news releases and articles from popular periodicals. As careful researchers attest, such sources
are frequently replete with faulty and misleading information and therefore are seldom useful to the serious student of criminology and
criminal law.
In search of an understanding of the problems and issues involved in this new field of
crime, no single source of information will be
found adequate. For that reason, Computer
Abuse and Criminal Law deserves examination
in spite of its shortcomings.
RONALD T. SLIVKA

Morgan Guaranty Trust Company
New York, New York

By Roy R.
Grinker. New York: Behavioral Publications,
Inc. 1975. Pp. 262. $14.95.

PSYCHIATRY IN BROAD PERSPECTIVE.

CRIMINALITY AND PSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS. By

Samuel B. Gruze. New York: Oxford University Press. 1976. Pp. viii, 18. $9.50.
Here are two volumes, one an attempt at a
personal synthesis of psychiatric research in
general, the other a report of long term re-
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search on parolee and flat term felons. In my
view, both fail to achieve their goals, but for
different reasons.
Roy Grinker, with a distinguished career as
practicing psychiatrist, researcher and writer,
proposes to develop for his readers an "integrated theory," concretely exemplified in one
chapter on schizophrenia and embracing biological, psychological and social cultural levels.
His ordering concept is the systems approach,
"a conglomerate science composed of a variable
number of parts." (p. 177) Unfortunately, his
focus on "the system by which the human
person maintains his integrity" (idem) does not
enhance the integrity of this volume, in which
swatches of passages or highly compressed
summaries of disparate materials, really "systematized," are intertwined with a text that moves
too fast for at least the present reader to digest.
Though a reviewer may not justly complain
about an author's choice of emphasis, it must
be said that Mr. Grinker's apparent claim to
present an up-to-date picture of the state of
contemporary psychiatric research shows a peculiarly limited view of what is happening in
the present. There is no evidence in his farflung quotations that a feminist revolution has
penetrated both psychotherapy and research
on human behavior. Chapters which purport
to show the place of cultural dimension, such
as an opening discussion on magic and one on
social and cultural techniques applied to psychiatry, are either naive (he adopts a Comtean
stage theory to locate magic and simply has not
kept up with the literature which sees magic
more and more as a cosmology on a par with
science in its context) or incomplete (he talks
about transcultural phenomena and "social turbulence," but, in a highly abbreviated discussion, has no place for the repercussions of
military and technological policies and trends
on people's life chances, personal stress and
behavior).
Samuel Gruze has evidently sought to avoid
the familiar animadversions against psychiatry's
poor sampling methods. Since 1959 he and his
colleagues have been applying psychiatric concepts and criteria-interviews were conducted
by trained psychiatrists or advanced residentsto male (223) and female (66) felons consecutively handled with the cooperation of the Missouri Board of Probation and Parole and other
agencies which furnished supplementary documentary data, varying in detail from case to
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case. Predictably, he and his collaborators find
that psychoses and neuroses form only the
smallest proportion of diagnoses for these men
and women who have committed conventional,
major crime. Instead, "sociopathy," alcoholism
and drug addiction are said to be the psychiatric problems which account for most of the
study population's behavior. Since, however, it
is notorious that these three categories of criminals have resisted rehabilitation, Gruze is led
to emphasize the finding that "the risk of
reconviction of a felony was 60 percent in men
under age forty who were also flat-timers compared to 6 percent in men forty or older who
were also parolees-a tenfold difference." (p.
137) It follows that "imprisonment until middle
age, at least for recidivist criminals, should
result in a major reduction in recidivism after
discharge from prison." (p. 137)
Thus, Gruze's elaborate study ends up as
one more instance of the current fashionable
pessimism about criminological issues ("nothingworksism"). In my opinion, he has not succeeded in his attempt to meet the well-known
objections to the psychiatric approach. He has
not compared this population to a parallel
civilian population; he has not been as critical
as he might about the catchall, "sociopathic"
(see the recent critique by Vaillant); he fails to
see that criminal behavior is peculiarly definitional and cannot as such be analyzed as though
it were radically different from non-criminal
(e.g., the victim's) behavior; he only notices a
possible socio-historical element affecting his
study in the case of the high narcotic drug
percentage among female felons. Finally,
Gruze appears to take too seriously psychiatric
diagnoses, almost as though they were essences
and not, as Seymour Halleck has suggested, as
hypotheses applied to each case with the greatest humility.
The place of psychiatry in the social sciences
generally will not be resolved by repeating
conventional thinking over a long term, but
only through interdisciplinary penetration and
the kind of integrated theory which Grinker
claimed to have achieved and Gruze needed.
SEYMOUR FIDDLE

HUnter College

CRITICAL CRIMINOLOGY. Edited by Ian Taylor,
Paul Walton and Jock Young. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975. Pp. 244. $18.75.

Taylor, Walton and Young make some remarkable criticisms of the "new deviancy theorists" or 'radical" criminologists, in effect selfcriticism, in "Critical Criminology in Britain:
Review and Prospects," their own contribution
to this collection of writings:
These formal agreements amongst deviancy
theorists were based more upon antipathies to
orthodox criminological formulations than they
were upon any clear alternativeformulations ..,In
retrospect, the alternative positions appear to
be little more than inversions on orthodox...
perspectives, and cannot be seen to have transcended the fundamental features of orthodox
criminology, (p. 8, emphasis added)
What allows Taylor, Walton and Young to join
their critics in noting the absence of a genuine
alternative theory in the "new" criminology
and in finding their past contributions "to be
little more than inversions," is their turn to
Marxist theory to provide a backbone for "socialist" or "working-class" criminology.
This book has two foci. First, it contains
writings by American radical criminologists,
successfully presenting a representative sampling of their work. Because these are works
by Tony Platt, Herman and Julia Schwendin,
ger, William J. Chambliss, and Richard Quinney that have been previously published or are
otherwise familiar, they can be safely ignored
for purposes of a brief review. Second, the
reader contains a sampling of recent and presumably unfamiliar developments in English
radical criminology, including works by Jock
Young, Paul Q, Hirst, Geoff Pearson, Ian
Taylor and Paul Walton. With the exception of
Pearson's essay, "Misfit Sociology and the Politics of Socialization," the English essays focus
on the problems of integrating Marxist theory
and radical criminology, This review will examine the English writings.
As Paul Q. Hirst makes sufficiently evident
in his critical essay, "Marx and Engels on Law,
Crime and Morality," orthodox Marxism is
relatively hostile to any attempt to use Marx tQ
legitimate a defense of the "authenticity" or
"politicality" of the deviant experience, Though
Marx and Engels did not devote extensive study
to the problem of crime, their attitude appears
to have been relatively ponservative on the
issue, and can be briefly summarized as follows:
(1) Marx appears to have felt, as Hirst amply
demonstrates, that exploitation (i.e., the ex-
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traction of surplus value) is not theft, nor is
the capitalist in any way criminal, 2 despite Taylor, Walton and Young's attempt to use Marx
to demonstrate the "criminal nature of bourgeois society." (p. 237)
(2) Marx and Engels had nothing but contempt for the so-called "criminal classes," and
this contempt, rather than representing "no
more than the prejudices of two Victorian
gentlemen" (p. 215) was structurally related to
their theory. Hirst quotes Marx and Engels
thus:
The "dangerous class," the social scum, the
passively rotting mass thrown off by the lowest
layers of the old society, may, here and there,
be swept into the movement by a proletarian
revolution, its conditions of life, however, prepare it far more for the part of a bribed tool of
reactionary intrigue. (p. 215)
(3) For Marx and Engels, "the 'criminal career' and the 'delinquent solution,' however
much enforced by the harsh necessities of capitalism, are not in effect forms of political rebellion against the existing order but a more or
less reactionary accommodation to them." (p.
218)
(4) Finally, given the key role that the structured use of labor-power to create surplus
value (profit) plays for Marx in defining the
political cutting edge of his theory (by focusing
on the contradictions in capitalism centered
around the proletariat), theft, since it is nonsurplus-value generating, is wasteful, unnecessary activity. Though Taylor, Walton and
Young may find in the thief a "primitive rebel"
(a la E. J. Hobsbawm), Hirst shows that for
Marx, the thief "is ... neither a productive
nor an unproductive laborer, nor is he a capitalist, rather he is strictly parasitic on the labor
and wealth of society .... Theft... always
merely redistributes the existing material production or wealth and adds nothing to the
stock of material production." (p. 224)
Hirst's article and a reply by Taylor, Walton
and Young were originally published in Economy and Society. What is interesting about the
reply is Taylor, Walton and Young's complete
lack of response to the substance of the position
outlined above. Rather, they attack (and quite
justifiably) the inclusion in Hirst's article of a
2
See also Colletti, The Theory of the Crash, in
TOWARD A NEW MARXISM 177 (B. Grahl & P. Piccone
eds. 1973).
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needless defense of Louis Althusser's periodization of Marx into a "young idealist" Marx
and an "older scientific" Marx. However, given
Marx's "conservatism" on issues of crime, it is
obvious that Taylor, Walton and Young's attempt to turn their "radical criminology" (or,
as they call it elsewhere, "sceptical deviancy")
theory into a "Marxist" or "working-class" criminology will require considerable self-criticism
or back-tracking on their part.
Paul Q. Hirst may or may not be correct in
arguing that Marxism and radical criminology
are strange, if not incompatible, bedfelldws.
Either way, most of the conceptual difficulties
encountered by Taylor, Walton and Young in
their contributions to this reader appear to
stem from the attempt to synthesize Marx's
relatively orthodox criminological position with
one that is "little more than inversions on
orthodox . . . perspectives." (p. 8) Some of
these difficulties include:
(1) Taylor, Walton and Young's reduction of
the epistemological basis of positivist criminology to "pure objectivity" and that of labelling
theory to "pure subjectivity." Taylor, Walton
and Young, having miscreated this conceptual
antinomy by their simplistic reductionism, compound their difficulties by their peculiar use of
the concept of "praxis" to "dialectically transcend" it. "Praxis" is used as both the criterion
for valid knowledge and as the description of
genuinely "political" work in criminology.
However, as a criterion for valid knowledge,
"praxis" is defined as critical thought whereas,
in describing political criminology, it is presented as a way of behaving, "of changing the
social whilst investigating it." (p. 24) Taylor,
Walton and Young thus reproduce the dichotomy they believe they have transcended.
(2) An attempt to rationalize and reject their
supposedly past romanticization of the political
and moral authenticity of deviants, by seeing it
rooted in a sense of "powerlessness as to the
possibility of affecting the national culture, the
politics of social democracy, or indeed, the
politics of the orthodox Left itself ... an identification by powerless intellectuals with deviants who appeared more successful in controlling events...." (p. 18) Their problem
here is that they never abandon their romanticization of the deviant, calling for "socialist
diversity" (supposedly different from "non-socialist" diversity, or authenticity of various de-
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viant subjective perspectives), as one of their
radical demands. Further, they spend much of
their essay attacking the criminal justice policies
of Britain's Labor Party as well as dismissing, a
priori, any contact with the British Communist
Party (which has served for many of England's
most renowned intellectuals), thus guaranteeing their continued political isolation.
(3) Taylor, Walton and Young see a "materialist" criminology as primarily focusing on "the
antagonisms which result ... from the lack of
correspondence between the development of
material production and to the development of
social and legal relations." (p. 54) They call for
a Marxist sociology of law, a "science of legislation," but their focus completely ignores the
real problem of crime in the streets and the
way in which the working class is penalized by
such crime.
(4) Jock Young claims that crime can be
determined, the criminal "as much a thing without volition as water." (p. 78) However, he also
claims that crime can be volitional, "an individualized and primitive form of [class] consciousness .... " (p. 78) This is an example of the
uneasy fit of "radical" criminology and Marxism. Even if the above two were not incompatible, Young judiciously avoids presenting any
standards that would allow us to differentiate
between them, and provides us with no examples of either.
(5) A final irony should be noted. Insofar as
Young places himself in a Marxist tradition, he
shifts from the radical focus of elaborating the
conflict-mediating role of the criminal justice
system to attempting to explain the consensual
support of the working class for orthodox criminological notions and reforms. The absence
of conflict, the reality of consensus is discovered and becomes the new problem. As a
Marxist, Young now discovers he must abandon, or at least temporarily table, radical notions of the conflict between the powers that be
and the deviant to explain the lack of class
conflict in the criminal justice system.
The above criticisms merely touch the surface of the problems Taylor, Walton and
Young and other radical criminologists face in
confronting Marx. This is not to say that the
Marxist tradition cannot provide the basis for a
powerful critical theory in criminology, nor
that by focusing on a "science of legislation,"
Taylor, Walton and Young are not groping

toward a Marxist theory of the State, which
will be central as Marxists analyze the criminal
justice system. However, Taylor, Walton and
Young still lack a developed "theory," much
less a "Marxist theory," and they will not create
one by ignoring the contempt for criminals
Marx shows in his later writings.
Critical Criminology affords us a glance at the
past, present and future of radical criminology
and is probably the most successful and representative reader of its kind. Its problems are
due not to the selection of articles, but to the
somewhat underdeveloped state of radical
criminological theory.
BARRY MIKE

University of Pennsylvania
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN CANADA: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF REPRESSIVE LAW. By David

Chandler. Toronto: McClelland and Steward
Limited, 1976. Pp. xxiv, 224. Paper. $5.95.
Anyone interested in the recent Canadian
history of capital punishment before it was
abolished in 1976 will find this book informative. Chiefly by using public opinion reports
and parliamentary votes, the author, a political
scientist, undertakes to present a sociological
study that "will bridge the traditional distinctions among sociology, political science and
jurisprudence." Within the strict confines of
his bold project consisting of two-hundred odd
pages and ninety-six tables, excluding the ones
located in the appendixes, the author's effort
is laudable. However, this study of the complex
questions involved with the death penalty is
flawed by theoretical, methodological and editorial looseness. Some comments about the
latter first.
At the outset the reader is confused as to the
exact time period to be covered by the book.
For example, in the Preface the author notes
that the book presents evidence on public opinion and legislative behavior concerning capital
punishment for 1967 and 1973. At the beginning of Chapter One, however, the reader
learns the book is to be an investigation of a
decade of Canadian parliamentary and national
debates about capital punishment. By the time
the author reaches Chapter Two, he decides
the book is occupied with the period between
1965 and 1972. Actually, it is chiefly concerned
with 1967-1973, a conclusion one would not
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have to seek had the book been scrutinized by
its editors with a keen concern for clarity and
consistency. Additionally, the editors should
have asked Chandler to use words that accurately describe his endeavors. For example,
early in the book Chandler has been allowed to
say he wants to "expose" important theoretical
generalities, when in fact he wants to "explore"
such generalities; in this case, Durkheim's work
on repressive law. A little later Chandler states
that compliance with law follows to the extent
the laws codify the beliefs and values of people.
Two pages later this is followed by the statement that everyone accommodates to the rules
of the law no matter how much his ideology
conflicts with his faith in law.
In the same section of the book summarizing
the 1966-1967 Canadian Parliament debates on
capital punishment, the author says the choices
of positions proffered were remarkably clear
and transcended particular points in time. Yet
in the next sentence he reports that major
themes can be "imposed" on the arguments. If
the choices are of great clarity, then they are
not "imposed"; rather, they are easily identified. When presenting the evidence about the
1966-1967 debates, Chandler states that the
retentionists tended to express retributive morality, while the abolitionists took the more
pragmatic arguments. In his next sentence,
however, the author asserts that both sides
included as many pragmatic and moral arguments as could be mustered, a statement suggesting a contradiction of the previous statement. Examples of such nuisances are frequent
throughout the book. Some of the most even
and clear writing is found in the sections presenting descriptive information; for example,
the chronological history of capital punishment
in Canada.
In his discussion of the uses of the capital
punishment law between 1946 and the 19661967 debates, Chandler argues that no reliable
studies have indicated the underprivileged
were overrepresented in executions. Support
for this conclusion is referenced in Table Two
of Appendix I. Unfortunately, this table, which
could be one of the most important items in
the book, simply cannot support the author's
statement. Examination of this table reveals
very little if anything about the underprivileged
unless one assumes being underprivileged is
coterminous with ethnicity. Not even this du-
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bious assumption is of much assistance in addressing the question of representativeness in
executions, since the table reports the final
dispositions of the convicted murderers by ethnicity without any indication of the distribution
of ethnicity in Canada for the years 1946 to
1967, which leaves the question of representativeness unanswered.
Public opinion on the abolition or retention
of capital punishment is central to the author's
work. Unfortunately, however, he misconstrues the trends. At one point, for example,
he notes there was a general decline in the
percentage of those wanting the death penalty
until 1971, when a reverse trend was reported.
By examining the table which Chandler uses as
support for this observation, the reader will
see the downward trend existed from 1943
(73% pro) until 1966 (53% pro), not 1971. In
1970 the proportion of those pro-death penalty
was 70%; however, this was down the next
year to 63%, which was consistent with the
overall trend of less and less pro support. The
fact that the 1971 pro figure was 63%, ten
points higher than for 1966, is explained by a
well-publicized kidnapping which occurred in
1970, producing a temporary increase in prodeath penalty sentiment, rather than indicating
a general reversed trend. Unfortunately for
the reader, this point is not made until ten
pages after the statement and figures reporting
a reversed trend.
When explaining the relationship between
public opinion, education and the death penalty in 1965, Chandler concludes there was no
difference by education for those who would
retain the death penalty. However, the table
cited, number 5, shows a considerable difference: for those favoring retention, there is a
19.4% difference between graduates of technical schools and those having some university
education. This confusion between statement
and printed figures remains when later the
author notes there is a difference; the reader
does not know which conclusion to believe.
Such examples of confusion ill prepare the
reader to later accept in Chapter Four, on the
basis of the most opaque reasoning, the statements that the vote of a Member of-Parliament
actually can be taken as representing the sentiments of members of a constituency. Chandler,
it seems, assumes political representativeness
can substitute for representativeness based on
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sampling. This position is of little persuasiveness, as are some of the theoretical interpretations central to the book.
Chandler's reliance on Durkheim's work
makes it necessary first to correct the author's
claim that Durkheim's generalizations on punishment appear in an untranslated article. The
article, "Two Laws of Penal Evolution," first
brought to the attention of American sociology
in T. Parsons (1937) The Structure of Social
Action, chapter X, had been translated twice
before Chandler's claim: first in the University
of Cincinnati Law Review at 32 (1969), and in
Economy and Society at 2 (1973). More important
than this oversight is Chandler's interpretation
of Durkheim's position.
Durkheim argued in The Division of Labor
that in societies characterized by mechanical
solidarity punishment would be repressive,
while in societies with organic solidarity it
would be restitutive. This is his position in its
most simple and unelaborated form. In the
"Two Laws of Penal Evolution," Durkheim's
most thorough examination of penal evolution,
it is apparent Durkheim departed significantly
from his original position, a divergence unrecognized and hence not addressed by Chandler.
One change, noted in "the law of quantitative
variations," modified the importance of sentiment, as it first appeared in The Division of
Labor, by introducing punitive intensity and
political absolutism as important explanatory
concepts. In Chandler's analysis, societal development or complexity is presented as if no
change had occurred in Durkheim's thinking
on punishment.
A second change, found in "the law of qualitative variations," is the assertion that deprivations of liberty tend increasingly to become the
normal type of repression. However, this is
not so much associated with societal complexity
per se, as Chandler would have us believe, as it
is with an increase in altruism; that is, the
desire to make one suffer has declined since
the time of the city-state, when the distinctions
between subject and master were great. This
change has had the general effect of reducing
the sense of social distance between people,
and it is less likely that severe punishments,

such as capital punishment, will be inflicted on
one's equal. Exceptions to this trend, according
to Durkheim, are found when "religious
crimes" are committed; that is, crimes against
"traditions" such as the state, gods or ancestors.
An act which is, in Durkheim's terms, "simply
blameworthy when it involves one's equal, becomes impious when it involves someone who
is one's superior."
One important implication of Durkheim's
reformulation is that questions of whether one
is "for" or "against" capital punishment, even
when such factors as age, education, ethnicity
and religion are included, miss the mark. More
light would be shed on the complex questions
surrounding capital punishment if questions of
"for" or "against" were asked for specific offenses where the social distance or relationship
between victim and offender was specified.
Then it would be more likely the reformulated
Durkheimian explanation, based in part on
sentiment, could be successfully used in research. Evidence recently reported in an anthropological study by H. P. Lundsgaarde,
titled Murderin Space City: A CulturalAnalysis of
Houston Homicide Patterns (1977), Oxford University Press, suggests Durkheim's theorizing
on social distance and punishment has promise.
Lundsgaarde found that the most severe punishments for homicide were given to those who
killed people they did not know, thus suggesting that the severest repressive sanctions result
in cases of murder when the social distance
between victim and offender most closely approximates the social distance in the crimes
Durkheim labelled "religious."
What we have in Chandler's book is documentation of the various positions recorded in
Canada on capital punishment before it was
abolished. As a collection of such documentation, it is a valuable source for future comparative analysis, but its generality does little to
help us understand the changes recorded, nor
does it provide an empirical test of either
Durkheim's original or elaborated work on
punishment.

J.
Northern Kentucky University
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The Polygraph ("Lie-Detector") Technique
Second Edition
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he polygraph techniques
and theory described in
these pages are based upon the
authors' collective
professional experience in
testing over 100,000 persons in
actual case situations. Every
aspect of the polygraph and its
application is thoroughly
examined. The contents
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include a detailed outline of
the procedure for pretest
interviewing, preparation and
administration of test
questions, and instrument
adjustment. All of the subtle
indicators that must be
considered during a polygraph
examination and after it, when
formulating a critical
evaluation, are discussed and
clearly illustrated with case
history data from the authors'
files. Careful application of the
techniques described here will
inevitably result in a more
favorable status for the polygraph than currently exists.
1977/360 pages/illustrated/
$32.00
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